Jia Qingguo on the Non-Mainstream Trump

U.S. President Trump began his second term on January 20 of this year, and it’s now been a month. On the eve of this year’s Two Sessions, a reporter from the Chinese Review News Agency interviewed Jia Qingguo—an executive member of the 14th National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference and the director of the Peking University Center for Sino-Foreign Cultural Exchange—to discuss the trends in Trump’s second-term foreign policy and its potential impacts. Jia explained that while there are both challenges and opportunities for China-U.S. relations under Trump’s second term, overall the challenges far outweigh the opportunities.

Jia is one of the leading scholars in China’s international relations research. He’s conducted deep, groundbreaking studies on China-U.S. relations, Chinese foreign policy, and regional security, and he has held key positions such as the dean of Peking University’s School of International Relations. His contributions to the field and to talent cultivation have been outstanding. At the same time, by participating in international seminars and engaging in public affairs, he’s helped build an effective platform for communication between academic circles and policy makers both in China and abroad, earning widespread recognition and respect.

Below is the full transcript of the interview:

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Reporter (Chinese Review News Agency):
Trump has now begun his second term, and we’ve noticed that recently the U.S. State Department modified its page on U.S.-China relations and its fact sheet. Do you think these changes reflect any shifts in Trump’s policy toward China during his second term?

Jia Qingguo:
The act of revising the fact sheet largely reflects the differences between this administration and the previous one. On China-related policy issues, it shows some new policy leanings. Trump seems to be placing greater emphasis on strategic competition and trade issues—though he still mentions human rights among other things—but he mainly prioritizes trade and competition. Additionally, on the Taiwan issue, he has deleted language that stated “does not support Taiwan independence.” We saw similar changes during the Biden administration in 2022, though those were later reversed, which shows there’s considerable internal debate in the U.S. over Taiwan. Given that overall bilateral relations aren’t great, more and more people are thinking that the U.S. might need to change its current stance on Taiwan—that is, the approach they consider excessively pro-China. This change might reflect that trend. But regardless, two things remain unchanged: first, Taiwan is part of China’s territory; and second, the capability of the Chinese mainland to defend its territorial sovereignty keeps growing.

Reporter:
Earlier, you mentioned that Trump might shift from a deliberately ambiguous policy on Taiwan to a more clear-cut one. But is it still hard to tell at this point?

Jia Qingguo:
Yes, definitely. For the past few years in the U.S., there’s been ongoing discussion about this issue, with some arguing that “strategic clarity” should replace “strategic ambiguity” because they believe the current U.S. policy of supporting Taiwan isn’t clear enough if a crisis occurs. But in reality, strategic ambiguity is designed to maximize U.S. interests. From the American perspective, strategic ambiguity helps avoid two problems: if the U.S. openly declares it will intervene in a Taiwan crisis, that could embolden pro-independence forces and trigger a Taiwan Strait war that would drag the U.S. into a conflict with China—which the U.S. does not want; yet, if it says it won’t intervene, that might encourage the Chinese mainland to take military action against Taiwan, which is also undesirable for the U.S. So overall, strategic ambiguity serves U.S. interests and has been maintained for many years. Recently, some in the U.S. have started calling for a tougher stance on China, driven more by irrational sentiment and a sole focus on opposing China, while overlooking America’s own interests.

Reporter:
The New York Times has quoted several sources saying that Trump plans to strike a new trade deal with China, with a key requirement being that China increases its U.S. investment and purchases more American goods. What’s your take on this?

Jia Qingguo:
Based on Trump’s stated intentions, it does seem that he has that idea. Although he campaigned on imposing a 60% tariff on Chinese goods, once in office he only proposed 10%, while imposing 25% tariffs on goods from Mexico and Canada. This may be because he still views tariffs as a bargaining chip. If a 60% tariff were actually imposed, bilateral trade could collapse, and the damage to the U.S. might be as severe as the damage to China. Trump’s goal is to restore American competitiveness—he wants U.S. companies to return to domestic production and to rebuild U.S. manufacturing, while also hoping that other countries, including Chinese companies, will invest in the U.S. But that might be wishful thinking. American labor costs are too high, making it unprofitable—or even loss-making—for companies to produce in the U.S. Moreover, some in the U.S., especially Republicans, tend to view everything from a security standpoint and believe that Chinese investment in the U.S. could pose security risks. So regardless of whether Chinese companies invest in agriculture or other sectors, they might be seen as security threats.

I recall that when I attended a conference in the U.S. last year, Trump’s first-term national security adviser O’Brien gave a video address showing satellite images marked with red dots, which he claimed indicated the locations where Chinese investors were buying real estate in the U.S.—implying a strategic agenda behind these purchases. If even real estate investment is viewed as a security threat, then what investment wouldn’t be? Whether Trump can change these views and allow Chinese companies to invest in the U.S. remains a huge question mark. At the same time, Chinese companies may not be eager to invest in the U.S. either, given the high risks involved. U.S. policies are extremely uncertain, and there’s a history of “bad records”—for example, in the 1980s, Japanese companies investing in the U.S. suffered huge losses, with many companies losing everything. Although the U.S. is often seen as a “law-abiding country,” recent actions have shown that it might not always be the case. Whether U.S. law can safeguard companies’ legitimate rights—especially in a highly politicized environment and when national relations are strained—remains an open question. So, for now, Chinese companies face a significant lack of security guarantees when investing in the U.S.

Reporter:
Trump often says that “tariffs” are the most beautiful word he’s ever heard. Now that he’s back in the White House, he intends to continue using tariffs against several countries in Eurasia, Africa, and elsewhere. What do you think about his “tariffs-first” strategy?

Jia Qingguo:
In the past, tariffs were mainly used by weaker or less developed countries to protect their domestic industries. The U.S. has long championed free trade, so Trump’s approach is a complete reversal of traditional U.S. policy—he believes that tariffs can generate more national wealth. But from an economic standpoint, tariffs are actually a barrier to wealth creation. Only through free trade, by fully exploiting comparative advantages, can a country accumulate more wealth. In the short term, Trump might be able to achieve some of his goals with tariffs, but in the long run, this will cause American companies to lose their competitiveness under a “tariff umbrella.” The impact on U.S. national strength will only grow—America will become increasingly dependent on tariffs, eventually leading to an irreversible decline.

Reporter:
As you said, tariffs might offer short-term benefits, but in the long run, Trump’s tariff policy means that American citizens and companies will have to foot the bill, and Trump seems to have a particular fondness for tariffs. Why does he have this view?

Jia Qingguo:
To be honest, it’s really hard to understand Trump’s approach. One explanation is that he’s a non-mainstream figure who doesn’t really subscribe to conventional wisdom and believes his own views are superior. Another explanation is that he might still be living in the 19th century, when even as America was rising, tariffs were used to protect domestic industries. A final explanation is that, at this stage, as American manufacturing is in decline, Trump hopes to stop this outflow by erecting tariff barriers to protect domestic industry and rebuild American manufacturing.

Regardless of the reasons, in the long term, relying on tariffs and other coercive measures to rebuild American manufacturing just isn’t feasible. It will only make American companies even less competitive and cause them to lose their share in the global market.

Reporter:
Not long ago, Trump mentioned that he would impose a 25% tariff on semiconductors and might even raise it further. Meanwhile, Taiwan’s Lai Ching-te government also proposed a Global Semiconductor Democratic Supply Chain Partnership. What do you think of Lai’s proposal?

Jia Qingguo:
I think Lai Ching-te is quite anxious in the face of Trump’s new policies. Trump has expressed that Taiwan should shoulder more responsibilities for its own security. He has also said that TSMC “gets a huge free ride” in the U.S., so Taiwan should pay a “protection fee” to America. Faced with this dilemma, Lai Ching-te still insists on the “Taiwan independence” notion and distancing himself from the mainland; he can only try to absolve himself by playing the ideology card, attempting to tie Taiwan more closely with the U.S. under the banner of “democracy.” But I think that approach is unlikely to work. Trump doesn’t seem to care as much about values as he does about benefits. The real question is: What can Taiwan really offer the U.S.? Why should America risk such a huge chance of war to support Taiwan? What constitutes a fair deal here? That’s what Trump cares about. So Lai Ching-te’s little scheme is unlikely to succeed.

Reporter:
You previously mentioned that there are both challenges and opportunities in China-U.S. relations under Trump’s presidency, though challenges dominate. Specifically, what do you see as the main challenges we face with the current U.S.?

Jia Qingguo:
There are many challenges. First, there are economic issues—imposing an additional 10% tariff on top of existing tariffs is not trivial. That would severely impact trade between the two countries, affecting our employment and U.S. consumer prices. Recently, there’s even been talk of adding another 10%! If implemented, the impact would be even greater. Another challenge is high-tech export restrictions. Under Trump, will high-tech export restrictions expand further? Although there’s bipartisan consensus on being tough on China in terms of strategic competition, the Republican side is generally even tougher on China, particularly when it comes to high-tech issues, making it easier to frame them as security concerns. That means if Trump isn’t personally intervening, a Republican administration would likely take a harder line on high-tech policies toward China. Of course, Trump himself remains a very uncertain factor—it’s still hard to say exactly what he will do. Another challenge is the Taiwan issue—Trump’s policy is still not very clear. In his previous term, he challenged the One-China Principle and even the U.S. one-China policy—for example, by taking calls from Tsai Ing-wen and sending Pompeo to visit Taiwan. This time, although some textual adjustments were made on the State Department website, it’s still not clear what concrete actions will follow.

Reporter:
Given all this uncertainty, how do you think China should respond?

Jia Qingguo:
I think first and foremost, we must stick to our principles and not compromise on core interests, whether it’s the Taiwan issue or national security. Second, on trade matters, we can negotiate with the U.S., because trade benefits both sides. It would be best if both parties could come to an agreement through negotiation to manage their economic and trade relationship. Of course, when it comes to specific sanctions from the U.S., there’s no need for us to respond in a tit-for-tat manner; instead, we should respond selectively based on our own interests. On high-tech issues, we need to do two things: on one hand, address our own shortcomings—fixing “bottleneck” issues like chips through faster R&D—and on the other hand, leverage our strengths by excelling at what we do so that when others try to restrict us, we can in turn restrict them. On the Taiwan issue, we must remain principled and increase our deterrence to ensure that Taiwan cannot separate from our country, while also promoting people-to-people exchanges across the strait to create conditions for peaceful reunification.

Reporter:
It’s often said that the cabinet members chosen by Trump for his second term are extremely loyal to him. In your view, how much influence does he personally wield at this point?

Jia Qingguo:
At least in the early stage of his term, I think his personal influence is still very significant. He selects people who are loyal to him—even those who will flatter him without question—so there’s little reason for them to oppose him. Moreover, many of his supporters are blindly loyal; they support everything he does. Under these circumstances, his personal influence is huge. He is also very proactive in doing things, regardless of whether they are right or wrong, and this has led to significant changes in both domestic and foreign policies in the U.S. We’re seeing domestic measures like layoffs, anti-corruption efforts, agency cuts, and crackdowns on political rivals, as well as dramatic shifts in immigration policy. Internationally, he has raised issues of territorial annexation—like with Greenland, Canada, and the Panama Canal—and there are also tariffs and the Russia-Ukraine war. Trump is personally very involved, and his policy adjustments have been so drastic that even his opponents are stunned. These are changes that, just a few months ago, were hard to imagine. However, many of his policies are damaging to a lot of people’s interests and will undoubtedly provoke strong backlash. Additionally, by challenging some of America’s core values and principles, he’s likely to face even more opposition. Given this double-edged backlash, it remains uncertain whether his core team will continue to support him as unwaveringly as before—and whether his original supporters will remain blindly loyal. I think these factors are major variables, and the 2026 midterm elections may serve as the ultimate test.

Reporter:
What impact do you think the outcome of the talks between the U.S., Russia, and Saudi Arabia will have on the current international political landscape? And what role do you think China will play in reaching a peace agreement to end the Ukraine crisis?

Jia Qingguo:
A cessation of the Russia-Ukraine war is possible. Even if the U.S. doesn’t change its policy, Russia and Ukraine have reached a point where the conflict is no longer sustainable—Ukraine has lost many lives, many more have been injured, and a large number of people have emigrated. The country is nearly entirely dependent on foreign debt, and without external support, it would be very hard to continue the war. Domestically in the U.S., support for Ukraine has already reached a tipping point, and Russia is reportedly exhausted as well, with about 60% of its government expenditure going toward the war. At this point, it’s time for both sides to sit down and discuss a ceasefire. However, there are significant differences: Russia demands continued occupation of Crimea and parts of eastern Ukraine, while Ukraine insists on their return—differences that are difficult to reconcile. Now, the Trump administration’s approach differs from Biden’s, as Trump appears to want Ukraine to accept Russian demands. But I think Ukraine would hardly accept that; if President Zelensky were to do so, he’d be seen as a traitor, which is too big a contrast to his status as a national hero. So a ceasefire might be possible, but a full resolution in the short term is unlikely.

Therefore, I think the future might see a ceasefire first, followed by further negotiations. When a ceasefire is achieved, both sides would benefit, as neither would need to spend enormous resources or sacrifice more lives on the conflict. However, whether this is what Trump wants remains questionable. Trump might be aiming to solve the problem once and for all, but Ukraine is unlikely to concede, and Europe might not agree either. I believe China can play a role in facilitating a ceasefire by helping to negotiate between the U.S., Europe, and Ukraine. Some argue that as long as the Russia-Ukraine war continues, the U.S. will be dragged into it and won’t be able to focus on China, but I think that’s wishful thinking—there have already been many calls in the U.S. to sanction China on the grounds that its support for Russia has shifted the balance on the battlefield. In this context, a ceasefire in the Russia-Ukraine war might actually help reduce some of the pressure on China. Meanwhile, some worry that if the war ends, the U.S. and Russia will quickly grow closer in a way that harms China. I believe that concern is overblown—historically, various U.S. administrations’ attempts at joint containment with Russia have ultimately failed, mainly because Russia’s geopolitical views and values are too different from those of the U.S.

Reporter:
Recently, Trump made an exception by referring to North Korea as a “nuclear state.” Does that offhand remark indicate a dramatic change in U.S. policy toward North Korea, or is it just a return to his signature individualistic style of diplomacy?

Jia Qingguo:
I don’t think there has been a major shift in U.S. policy toward North Korea, nor is it likely to change significantly in the near future. What I mean is that the U.S. still opposes North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons, though the specific approach may evolve over time. During Biden’s administration over the past few years, there hasn’t been much progress on the North Korean nuclear issue. Many Americans believe that North Korea is already a nuclear state, but the U.S. government generally avoids stating that publicly. Of course, there is still a lot of uncertainty regarding the exact number and types of nuclear weapons North Korea possesses. After Trump took office, his primary focus was on resolving the Russia-Ukraine conflict before turning his attention to North Korea, as tackling both simultaneously is quite challenging.

Furthermore, Trump may hope to use his personal influence to ease tensions between the U.S. and North Korea regarding its nuclear program, though it’s hard to imagine why North Korea would simply follow his lead. Trump might think that he had a chance during his first term to persuade Kim Jong-un to give up nuclear weapons, but he wasn’t successful—and even missed out on a Nobel Peace Prize opportunity because of that. So after his return, he might try again, but it’s too early to tell what will happen. In recent years, South Korea’s anxiety over North Korea and its growing distrust of the U.S. have led many South Koreans to call for their own nuclear weapons, and pro-nuclear sentiment in Japan is also on the rise. In this context, Washington is seriously considering whether to deploy tactical weapons in South Korea—a matter we need to watch closely.